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1 Introduction
In many cities population groups are sorted into distinct spatial neighborhoods. Many US
metropolitan areas have a China town, a little Italy, or other ethnic enclaves which host
significantly higher concentrations of ethnic or cultural groups. Such enclaves may range
from a single block to areas of a few square miles. For most observers, the main reason
for such spatial segregation lies in the economic ties and social interactions that people
have with individuals of their reference group. The prevalence of such a segregation is
exacerbated by poverty as poor people are more likely to see their economic prospects and
social relationships improved within their own ethnic group. Spatial concentration also
aects business and professional activities. The financial, retailing and manufacturing
sectors often locate their economic activity in separate industrial areas. For instance, in
Los Angeles, distinct neighborhoods host the movie, finance, fashion, and art industries.
For many urban economists, such industrial concentration is partly explained by the
stronger spillover that firms benefit from other firms active in the same industry.
The present paper aims at improving our understanding of spatial segregation and
concentration as resulting from the emergence of endogenous urban districts. We study
a one-dimensional city where agents engage in intra- and inter-group social interactions,
choosing their land consumption, as well as their location. Agents are heterogeneous
in the sense that each of them belongs to one of two distinct populations. Intra-group
interactions are more frequent than inter-group interactions: agents interact more often
with agents of their own population than with agents of the other group. Such preferential
interactions reflect stronger relationships between individuals sharing a common culture,
language, or ethnicity. They may also reflect professional relationships between group
members sharing the same economic activity (e.g., bankers, lawyers, or designers) or
economic status (e.g. employed or unemployed workers). We assume that populations are
symmetric in terms of their benefit from intra- and inter-group interactions: the intensity
of intra-group and inter-group social interactions is the same for both populations. Our
model does not rely on the exogenous existence of a city center (Alonso, 1964). Instead,
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as in Beckmann (1976), each agent visits other agents so as to benefit from a face-to-face
contacts, each trip involving a cost which is proportional to distance. In equilibrium, the
benefit from social interactions balances the residence and the access cost. The main issue
in this paper is about whether social interactions lead to spatial segregation and how these
interactions structure urban neighborhoods. Though segregation is a common result in
land market models in the urban literature, our paper constitutes the first attempt to
deal with the issue without assuming the exogenous existence of a central place.
Our results are the following. First, we show that integration never is a spatial equi-
librium. Both populations never cluster in an integrated city. This result is due to the
agents’ higher return from interacting with individuals of their own group. Given this,
agents have an incentive to relocate close to agents of their own population, so as to meet
more frequently, and therefore to save on trip costs.
Second, we analyze spatial structures involving segregation in two or three urban
districts. In a two-district city, populations separate in two neighboring districts. In a
three-district city, one population locates in the city center while the other one resides in
the two city edges. We show that both cases are possible.
The two-district city is a spatial equilibrium if populations have similar sizes or if inter-
group interactions are weak. In this case, the large population occupies a large central
urban district repelling the small population towards a city edge. The small population
accommodates such a situation as its interactions with the large group are weak, making
the incentive to relocate close to the large population´s district not suciently high. In
contrast, when the small population has stronger interactions with the large group, some
of its individuals have an incentive to relocate to the opposite city edge, where the large
population resides, so as to benefit from cheaper land rents and from a better accessibility
to the large group. The two-district then ceases to be a spatial equilibrium. Interestingly,
the two-district city can display one or two subcenters. When inter-group interactions
are weak, two subcenters arise. As intra-group interactions dominate, a separate basin of
attraction arises for each population. On the other hand, when one population is much
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larger than the other one, the city has a single subcenter as the large population’s district
also constitutes a basin of attraction for the small group.
The three-district city is always a spatial equilibrium when the large population locates
in the central district. In this case, the large population occupies the city area where it
benefits most from closer interactions though facing high land rents. The small population
benefits from lower land prices at the expense of a lower accessibility to agents of its own
group. The city is shown to exhibit a single subcenter occupied by the large population,
which constitutes a large basin of attraction for both groups. In contrast, when the
small population locates in the central district, we show that the three-district city may
not always be sustained as a spatial equilibrium. This is the case only if population
sizes are suciently similar or if inter-group interactions are weak. The existence of
this equilibrium configuration stems from a coordination problem. Although the large
population as a whole would benefit from occupying the city center, no individual agent
has an incentive to relocate in the central district as he would face an excessive residence
cost and lose access to individuals of his own group which are located in the city edges.
Third, we show that multiple equilibria may arise. Depending on the model para-
meters, various urban structures can coexist. The economy exhibits one, two, or three
spatial equilibria. The more similar the population sizes, and the weaker the inter-group
interactions, the more likely several equilibria to emerge. For high population ratios or
strong inter-group interactions, only the three-district city with the large group occupying
the central district exists. In other cases, multiplicity of equilibria arises. When several
spatial configurations are possible, spatial equilibria can be ranked in terms of the utility
derived by each population. A welfare analysis shows that for suciently low popula-
tion ratios or very weak inter-group interactions, all individuals agree on which spatial
equilibrium is best.
Our model suggests urban patterns that can be found for various language, racial
or ethnic groups. For instance, the Island of Montreal in Canada presents a East-West
division of the French- and the English-speaking communities. A similar North-South
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divide can be observed in the city of Brussels in Belgium between the Dutch- and the
French-speaking communities. While the city of Paris accommodates most of the foreign
ethnic groups away from the city center, US cities like New-York or Detroit host several
small ethnic and racial groups around the city center. Spatial segregation can also have
religious grounds. In the city of Belfast, the West and the East sides of the city are mostly
inhabited by Catholics and Protestants respectively. In general, the spatial clustering of
people in cities may be influenced by several other personal attributes, ranging from
professional activities to sexual habits. The paper focuses on the spatial sorting of two
communities diering in one such characteristic.
Our model helps understanding how city growth may aect urban structures. Given
the multiplicity of equilibria, city growth may induce spontaneous transitions from one
urban structure to another. So, the spatial structure of cities depends on history. Over
time, old cities like Paris have undergone several transitions and are now locked in a
configuration with the large (native) population in the city center. In contrast, younger
US cities like New York or Detroit may not have undergone such transitions and display
an urban configuration with the minority group in the city center.
Our model also sheds some light on the impact of social integration programs on
urban structures. Interpreting the frequency of inter-group interactions as an indicator
of social integration, our model provides some interesting insights. Spatial integration
should not be considered as an indicator of eciency of social integration programs. In
many instances, social integration programs may be ineective in reshaping the urban
landscape. Moreover, social integration may even fragment spatially the minority group.
The paper relates to the literature in several respects. Beckmann (1976), Fujita and
Thisse (2004), and Mossay and Picard (2011) have studied how non-market interactions
can shape urban structures by studying social interactions in a land market model with-
out assuming the pre-existence of an urban center to which residents commute. Fujita
and Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) have analyzed how market in-
teractions can shape the city structure by including firms and workers. Here, multiple
5
equilibria along the line segment are due to the introduction of inter-group interactions
as opposed to the corresponding single group model. Simple closed-form solutions are
obtained for two- and three-district urban structures. This allows us to characterize and
compare the equilibrium configurations, as well as to provide a rationale for these results.
As in Schelling (1971), individual location choices lead to spatial segregation patterns.
While the dynamics in Schelling´s model is driven by individual preferences for the neigh-
borhood composition, spatial segregation in our model arises although no individual agent
prefers or promotes this spatial outcome. Here, segregation hinges on the discrepancies of
social interactions that individuals have in the whole city and on competition in the land
market. So, our model reconciles Beckmann’s urban land market with Schelling’s idea of
segregation.
Glaeser et al. (2000) have stressed the important role of social interactions in the
formation of cities. While we address social interactions in an explicit spatial framework,
de Marti and Zenou (2012) study similar segregation issues arising in social networks. As
in their paper, we focus on intra- and inter-group social interactions between two groups
of individuals. The intra- and inter-group interactions can be interpreted as strong and
weak ties in the sense of Granovetter (1973). While de Marti and Zenou address various
social aspects (e.g. assimilation or oppositional identities), we study a land market model
with spatial interactions. In our model, the access cost is assumed to be small enough so
that each agent has an incentive to interact with all other agents distributed along the
line segment. This means that according to the terminology of de Marti and Zenou, our
economy always displays complete integration (e.g. each group is fully intra-connected
and both groups are fully inter-connected). However, here, in contrast to de Marti and
Zenou, the issue is not about whether an individual will maintain a social link with other
individuals, nor it is about the impact of the geometry of the social network. Rather,
we are interested in how location choices of individuals aect the structure of spatial
neighborhoods.1
1Note that the model by Hesley and Zenou (2012) addresses both location choices and endogenous
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies
the urban structure with integrated populations. Section 4 analyzes spatial segregation
in two and three districts. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume a linear city with a unit width which spreads over the interval B  [b, b] and
hosts two populations of agents P1 > P2. The density of agents of population i residing
at location x is denoted by the function i(x) : B  R+, i = 1, 2. Each individual enjoys
the same unitary benefit when interacting socially with another agent while incurring
an access cost  associated with the return trip to visit that agent. However, because
of cultural dierences or language barriers, social interactions are more frequent among
individuals of a same group. While agents meet each agent of their own population with
a frequency normalized to one, they meet each agent of the other group with a lower
frequency 0 <  < 1. So the social utility derived by an agent of population i can be
written as
Si(x) =

B
(1  |x y|)i(y)dy + 

B
(1  |x y|)j(y)dy , i = j
where the first term (resp. the second term) reflects the net benefit from intra-group
interactions (resp. inter-group interactions) with |x y| denoting the Euclidian distance
between locations x and y. The surplus S(x) can also be interpreted in a context of
uncertainty. In that case, it corresponds to the expected utility of an agent who plans to
interact with a subset of agents whom location and identity are not known at the time
of the residence choice. Such an interpretation applies to individuals moving to an urban
area with no a priori acquaintances. This could also apply to the case of shopkeepers,
sellers, as well as workers who expect to hold several jobs at dierent locations during their
lifetime, or employers who do not have a precise idea about future workers’ residences.
network formation. However, it does not focus on segregation issues.
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Agents maximize the utility they derive from consumption and social interactions
Ui (s, z;x) = Si(x) 
2s
+ z
subject to their budget constraint
z +R(x)s = Y
where s and z are the consumption of land and of the composite good, R(x) the land rent
at location x, Y the agent’s income2, and  the preference parameter for land consumption.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that land has no alternate use, so that R(x) = 0 in
uninhabited locations. In the above functional form of utility, we consider an hyperbolic
preference for land instead of the logarithmic preference used in Beckmann (1976) and
Fujita and Thisse (2002, Chapter 6). The present hyperbolic preference represents an
intermediate case between Beckmann’s demand and the inelastic demand for space that
is regularly used in standard urban economics.3
Since Alonso (1964) and Fujita (1989), the urban economic literature has regularly
relied on the bid rent approach to determine the spatial equilibrium. Because agents are
free to relocate anywhere along the geographical space, the absence of locational arbitrage
requires that the utility level of agents of a same population remains constant across all
locations inhabited by this population. The agent’s bid rent i in location x is defined as
the maximum rent that an agent is willing to pay for residing in x
i(x) = max
s
Y  z
s
s.t. Ui (s, z;x)  ui i = 1, 2
for some given utility level ui.
Let zi(x, ui) and si(x, ui) denote the bid-maximizing consumption of land and of the
composite good for an individual of population i residing in x. By using the agent’s
2Y can also be interpreted as the valuation of the endowment in the composite good.
3The hyperbolic and logarithmic preferences for residential space are two particular instances of the
same class of preferences s1/ (1 ) where  = 2 and   1 respectively, which yield iso-elastic
demands for residential space with price elasticities equal to 1/2 and 1 respectively.
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budget constraint, the bid rent i(x) can be written as
i(x) = max
s
Y  ui + Si  /(2s)
s
= max
s

Y  ui + Si
s
 
2s2

The optimal consumption of space corresponds to
si(x, ui) = 
Y  ui + Si
which yields the following bid rent:
i(x) =
(Y  ui + Si)2
2
=

2si2 (1)
A competitive spatial equilibrium is then defined by spatial distributions of consump-
tion {zi(x), si(x)}, land rent R(x), agents i(x), and utility levels ui which
(i) maximize each population’s bid rent (zi(x) = zi(x, ui) and si(x) = si(x, ui)),
(ii) allocate land to the highest bid (R(x) = maxi[i(x), 0] so that R(x) = i(x) if
i(x) > 0, and R(x) = 0 if i(x) = 0,i),
(iii) satisfy the land market equilibrium,

i i(x)si(x) = 1, and
(iv) meet the total population constraint
 b
b i(x)dx = Pi.
3 Integrated populations
In this section, we investigate the existence of integrated districts where both popula-
tion groups live together. Integrated urban structures are often advocated in the urban
planning literature; they are also shown to result from the balance between dispersion
and agglomeration forces in the urban economic literature (see e.g. Fujita (1989), Fujita
and Ogawa (1982), or Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002)). It turns out that our model
of social interactions does not support spatial equilibria with integrated populations. We
show below that this is because agents always have an incentive to relocate close to other
agents of their own group so as to meet more frequently.
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Suppose that the two populations are integrated in some interval so that 1(x) > 0 and
2(x) > 0 for all x in that interval. For this configuration to constitute an equilibrium,
land should be allocated to both populations. Hence, by equilibrium condition (ii), the
bid rents of both populations must be equal: 1(x) = 2(x). By expression (1), this
implies that land consumption should also be equal
s1(x) = s2(x)  s(x)
Agents have an identical use of space because their benefit from social interactions and
their preference for space are the same across both populations. As the land market
equilibrium (iii) implies that s(x) = [1(x) + 2(x)]
1, the agent’s utility becomes Ui =
Si(x) + Y   [1(x) + 2(x)] . The spatial gradient of utility is then given by
U i(x) =  [P
+
i (x) Pi (x)] +  [P+j (x) Pj (x)] 

i(x) + 

j(x)

, i = j = 1, 2 (2)
where
P+i (x) =
 b
x
i(y)dy and Pi (x) =
 x
b
i(y)dy = Pi  P+i (x)
denote the agents of population i to the right and to the left of location x. Clearly,
P+i (x) (resp. P

i (x)) is a decreasing (resp. increasing) continuous function. A necessary
condition for spatial equilibrium is that the utility of agents remains constant across
inhabited areas (U 1(x) = U

2(x) = 0). By using expressions (2) and solving for (P
+
i 
Pi )(x), we get
P+1 (x) P1 (x) = P+2 (x) P2 (x) =


1(x) + 

2(x)
1 + 
(3)
In equilibrium, both types of agents should have the same access to agents of their own
group. Any dierence in population access reflects a change of benefit from social inter-
actions which translates itself into a change of bid rent. If the bid rent gradients were to
dier, then one population would be able to overbid the other one. A direct implication
of this reasoning is that population densities should be identical in an integrated area, so
that 1(x) = 2(x). This result has two following consequences.
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First, at equilibrium, an integrated district must be interior to the city support. In
other words, no city border can be part of an integrated district. This is because at the
city border x = b, the first equality in condition (3) simplifies to P1 = P2, which is
impossible given that population sizes are dierent. Intuitively, as an integrated district
located at the city edge should host the same share of each population, the rest of the
city should consequently host a larger share of the large population. This will inevitably
induce relocations of individuals of the large group living at city edges to locations where
the access cost to the large group is lower.
Second, at equilibrium, only a single integrated district can exist. Stated dierently,
the city cannot include two integrated districts that are separated by an area hosting a
single population or no population at all. On the one hand, interactions are more valuable
within a district hosting a single population because agents benefit there from more intra-
group interactions. This attracts other agents of the same population living in neighboring
integrated districts. On the other hand, the presence of an uninhabited area within the
city increases the access cost to agents, and as land is priced at its zero opportunity cost,
agents have an incentive to relocate to a border of that inhabited area. This provides
them with cheap land and agood access to their own population. The formal argument
is provided in the proof of the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Population integration can only arise in a single interior district.
Proof. (i) Consider two integrated areas which are separated by a segregated district
[x1, x2] hosting a mass m > 0 of agents of population 1. We have P+1 (x1) P+1 (x2) = m
and P1 (x1)P1 (x2) = m while P+2 (x1)P+2 (x2) = P2 (x1)P2 (x2) = 0. Then, tak-
ing the dierence between conditions (3) evaluated at x = x1 and x = x2 yields 2m = 0,
which is a contradiction. Of course, the argument also holds for a segregated area hosting
population 2.
(ii) Consider an uninhabited area (x1, x2) and two adjacent districts with integrated pop-
ulations. Given that land has a zero opportunity cost outside inhabited areas, we have
11
that i(x1) = i(x2) = 0. At the borders of the empty district, population densities
are equal to zero and population imbalances are identical so that 1(x1) + 2(x1) =
1(x2) + 2(x2) = 0 and P+i (x1)  Pi (x1) = P+i (x2)  Pi (x2), i. The latter condition
and condition (3) imply that the gradients of population densities are identical at the
borders: 1(x1) + 

2(x1) = 

1(x2) + 

2(x2). By dierentiating condition (3) with respect
to x, the gradient 1(x+ 

2(x) can be shown to be a decreasing function. As the density
1(x)+2(x) cannot simultaneously fall to zero at x1 and rise from zero at x2, this proves
the absence of empty hinterlands in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 implies that integrated populations can only reside in a district surrounded
by segregated districts. However, this turns out to be impossible for the following reason.
When populations dier in size, imbalances in population access provide the individuals
of some population with an incentive to relocate away from the integrated district towards
the segregated one. So as to establish this result, we first present general properties about
utility levels when both populations segregate in distinct districts. These results will also
be of use in Section 4.
Suppose some segregated district [x1, x2] where i(x) > 0 and j(x) = 0, i = j = 1, 2.
We determine the utility and the density of the population residing within this district,
as well as the utility level that other agents would obtain by relocating into this district.
On the one hand, the agents residing in this district have a utility level given by
Ui = Si(x) + Y  
si
= Si(x) + Y  i
where the last term includes the density of population i only. The utility gradient is given
by
U i(x) =  [P
+
i (x) Pi (x)] +  [P+j (x) Pj (x)] i(x) = 0 (4)
so that the population gradient can be written as
i(x) =



[P+i (x) + P
+
j (x)] [Pi (x) + Pj (x)]

(5)
Population densities and land rents fall when less population can be accessed to. In
equilibrium, the marginal residence cost ´i equates the sum of the marginal access
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costs to individuals of her own group (P+i  Pi ) and to individuals of the other group
(P+j  Pj ). The frequency of interaction  discounts inter-group interactions as they
are less frequent than intra-group ones.
On the other hand, consider an agent of population j who does not reside in the
segregated district [x1, x2]. When considering relocating to location x  [x1, x2], she
will maximize her utility Uj = Sj(x)  / (2sj) + zj subject to her budget constraint
zj +R(x)sj = Y , where the equilibrium land rent, R(x), is equal to the highest bid made
by population i, i(x) = / [2si(x)2]. Given that i(x) = 1/si(x) and sj(x) = si(x), agent
j’s utility becomes
Uj (x) = Sj(x) i(x) + Y , x  [x1, x2]
This expression reflects her social interactions (first term) and her use of space that
diminishes with the density of population i (second term). Dierentiating this expression
and using the expression of the population gradient (5) gives
U j(x) =  (1 )

[P+j (x) Pj (x)] [P+i (x) Pi (x)]

(6)
In the above expression, population imbalances reflects the trade-o between population
access and land prices. Agent j’s utility increases as she relocates to the right in the
segregated district (U j(x) > 0) because she gets a better access to her own population
(P+j (x) Pj (x) > 0). Her utility also increases when the access to the other population
i worsens (P+i (x) Pi (x) < 0) as this reduces the equilibrium land rent.
We now show that an integrated district surrounded by segregated districts cannot be
sustained in equilibrium. Consider some integrated district [x1, x2] hosting both popula-
tions as well as two neighboring segregated districts. Consider some location x > x2 in
the segregated right-district. Let denote the mass of population 1 between locations x2
and x by n(x)   x
x2
1(x) > 0. For this configuration to constitute an equilibrium, it is
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necessary that U2(x2) U2(x) > 0. By using the utility gradient (6), we successively get
U 2(x) =  (1 )

[P+2 (x) P2 (x)] [P+1 (x) P1 (x)]

=  (1 )[P+2 (x2) P2 (x2)] [P+1 (x2) n(x) P1 (x2) + n(x)]
Given condition (3) in the integrated area (x1, x2), the above expression simplifies to
U 2(x) = 2 (1 )n(x) > 0. As a result, U2(x)  U2(x2) =
 x
x2
U 2(z)dz = 2 (1 ) x
x2
n(z)dz > 0 meaning that this city configuration cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
An analogous argument applies when population 2 lives in the segregated district. This
reasoning leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 No city includes an integrated district.
Proposition 2 results from the fact intra-group interactions are more frequent than
inter-group ones. At any equilibrium land price, agents have an incentive to relocate
close to agents of their own population so as to lower their access cost. Our analysis
shows that integrated residential patterns are inherently unstable as individuals have an
incentive to relocate closer to their own group. In contrast to Schelling´s paradigm, spatial
segregation does not stem from explicit preferences for the neighborhood composition.
Spatial segregation hinges on the discrepancies in social interactions and competition in
the land market. This sets the stage for the next questions: how do segregation patterns
arise and how do spatial neighborhoods form? We now turn to the analysis of cities with
segregated populations.
4 Segregated populations
According to the analysis of the previous section, cities must structure into a set of
segregated districts, each of them hosting a single population. In each district, individuals
favor intra- over inter-group interactions as they have a closer access to agents of their
own group while having a more remote access to agents of the other group. As we will
14
show below in this section, a population may well spread into several districts, in which
case, agents lose access even to agents of their own group.
We first establish the functional form of the population density within a segregated
district. In a district hosting population i only, land market clears so that i(x)si(x) = 1
for all locations x where i(x) > 0 (condition (iii)). Given this, the utility and the
population gradients are given by expressions (4) and (5) respectively. Dierentiating
once more the utility expression yields
U i = 0  2i  i = 0
This second order ordinary dierential equation accepts the following class of solutions
i(x) = Ci cos  (x i) (7)
where 2 = 2/ and the coecients Ci and i are constants to be determined. We define
a subcenter as a location where the density i(x), and therefore, the land rent R(x),
are maximal. As function (7) has a maximum at x = i, the coecient i determines
the location of a subcenter (if it exists), and the coecient Ci measures the amplitude
of population i’s density and therefore the population density, which corresponds to the
population density at its subcenter.
We now analyze the structure of cities with two and three segregated districts.
4.1 Two districts
Let the districts [0, b1] and [b2, 0] host populations 1 and 2 respectively. Such an urban
structure is best illustrated by the Island of Montreal or the city of Belfast where individ-
uals segregate in two distinct areas based on language or religious grounds. Population
densities are described by 1(x)  0 for x  [0, b1] and by 2(x)  0 for x  [b2, 0]. A
spatial equilibrium is then defined by a set of scalars and functions (bi,i), i = 1, 2, which
satisfy the following conditions:
(a) the no-relocation arbitrage conditions within a district: U 1(x) = 0, x  [0, b1] and
U 2(x) = 0, x  [b2, 0]
15
(b) the no-relocation arbitrage conditions between districts: U1(x)  U1(0), x  [b2, 0]
and U2(x)  U2(0), x  [0, b1]
(c) the continuity of bid rents at the borders of each district: 2(0) = 1(0) and 1(b1) =
2(b2) = 0, and
(d) the total population constraint: P1 =
 b1
0
1(x)dx and P2 =
 0
b2 2(x)dx
Conditions (a) and (b) ensure that agents have no incentive to relocate to another
location regardless of which population inhabits it. Conditions (c) ensure that land is
allocated to the highest bidder at the district border and that land is prices at its oppor-
tunity cost at the city edge. Conditions (d) guarantees that each districts is occupied by its
corresponding population. Note that the bid rent conditions (c) imply that 2(0) = 1(0),
1(b1) = 0, and 2(b2) = 0. This is because the bid rent i(x) is inversely related to the
use of space, si(x), which is itself inversely related to the population density, i(x).
Using conditions (a), (c) and (d), we compute the spatial distributions (7) as (see
details provided in Appendix A)
1 = C1 cos[(x 1)] and 2 = C2 cos[(x+ 2)] (8)
where
C1 =

2
(P1 + P2) and C2 =

2
(P1 + P2) (9)
sin(1) =
P1  P2
P1 + P2
and sin(2) =
P2  P1
P2 + P1
(10)
City borders are given by bi = i + /(2), i = 1, 2 .
Because P1 > P2, we have C1 > C2 so that population 1 reaches higher densities than
population 2. From expression (10), it is readily checked that 1 > 0, 1 > 2, and
b1 > b2. The maximum density of population 1 is C1 whereas that of population 2 may be
less than C2. Thus population 1 is more concentrated and benefits from a better access to
agents of its own group. Figure 1 depicts the urban structure with two spatial districts.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
We still have to check whether this urban structure satisfies the no-relocation arbitrage
conditions (b). The first condition states that agents of population 1 have no incentive to
relocate in population 2’s district. This can be checked by using relation (6),
U 1(x) =  (1 )

P1  [P2  2P2 (x)]

> 0
which means that U1(x)  U1(0), x  [b2, 0]. This is because P1 is larger than P2 and
P2 (x) increases from 0 to P2 in the interval [b2, 0]. No individual of the large population
has an incentive to relocate to the small population area. In contrast, the second condition
(b) does not always hold. By expression (6), we have
U 2(x) =  (1 )
P2  [P1  2P1 (x)]
where the curly bracket increases from (P1 + P2) < 0 to (P1  P2) > 0 in the interval
[0, b1]. Hence, the utility dierential U2(x)U2(0) =
 x
0
U 2(z)dz is a convex function that
first falls under zero and then eventually increases above zero. Clearly, U2(0)  U2(x),
x  [0, b1], if and only if U2(0)  U2(b1). Given that U2(0) = U2(b2) = S2(b2) + Y
and U2(b1) = S2(b1) + Y , the no-relocation arbitrage condition (b) can be rewritten as
S2(b2)  S2(b1). An individual of the small population area may well gain from moving
to the large population area so as to benefit from a better access to the large group. In
Appendix A, we show that the latter condition can be rewritten as
2

P1/P2 < (1 + )

  arccos

P1/P2  
P1/P2 + 

(11)
This argument yields the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 The spatial configuration with two segregated districts is a spatial equilib-
rium if S2(b2)  S2(b1); that is if condition (11) holds.
When P1/P2  , the inequality (11) is never satisfied. When P1/P2  1, the
condition becomes 2

 < (1 + ) {  arccos [(1 ) / ( + 1)]}, which can be shown to
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be always satisfied. More generally, it can be shown that there exists a unique threshold
for P1/P2 below which this condition is satisfied. So, the two-district configuration is an
equilibrium if populations are of similar sizes or if inter-group interactions are weak. In
equilibrium, the large population occupies a larger share of the urban area repelling the
small population towards the other city edge. The small population accommodates this
situation because its interactions with the large population are weak and because land
rents are too high in the other district.
We also investigate whether the spatial distribution of agents exhibit one or two sub-
centers, where a subcenter is defined as a location where the density i(x), and therefore,
the land rent R(x), are maximal. It readily comes from (10) that the city exhibits one
center at x > 0 if P1/P2 > 1/ (i.e. 1 > 0,2 < 0), while it exhibits two of them - one
on each side of x = 0 - if 1 < P1/P2 < 1/ (i.e. 1 > 0, 2 > 0).
Corollary 4 The two-district city exhibits a single subcenter if  > (P1/P2)1 and two
subcenters otherwise.
Both urban structures are depicted in the two panels of Figure 1. Of course, when
intra- and inter-group social interactions become equally frequent (  1), the location
choices made by agents lead to the emergence of a single subcenter. On the other hand,
when intra-group social interactions dominate inter-group ones ( 0), each population
group locates around its own subcenter while still benefiting from inter-group interactions
as both groups live in the same city. Relative population sizes also matter. When these
are similar, each population also forms its own subcenter. This is because strong intra-
group interactions create a separate basin of attraction for each population. In contrast,
when one population is much larger than the other one, its density becomes so high that
it also becomes a basin of attraction for the small population, which ceases to have its
own subcenter.
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4.2 Three districts
We consider urban structures with three districts. In these structures, the large population
may locate at either the center or the edge of the city.
Large population in the central district We consider a symmetric spatial configu-
ration in which the large population 1 resides within the central district [b1, b1] and the
small population 2 within the two edge districts [b2,b1] and [b1, b2].4 Such an urban
structure is reminescent of some European cities like Paris where the native population
concentrates around the city center and ethnic populations reside in the suburbs.
A spatial equilibrium is a set of non negative scalars bi, i = 1, 2 and two even functions
1 : [b1, b1] R+ and 2 : [b2,b1]  [b1, b2] R+ which satisfy:
(a) the no-relocation arbitrage conditions within each district: U 1(x) = 0, x  [0, b1]
and U 2(x) = 0, x  [b1, b2]
(b) the no-relocation arbitrage conditions between districts: U2(x)  U2(b1), x  [0, b1]
and U1(x)  U1(0), x  [b1, b2]
(c) the land rent continuity at district borders 2(b1 ) = 1(b
+
1 ) and 2(b2) = 0
(d) the total population constraint P1 =
 b1
b1 1(x)dx and P2 = 2
 b2
b1
2(x)dx
These conditions have an interpretation similar to that provided in the previous sec-
tion. Conditions (a), (c) and (d) allows us to determine the spatial distributions as (see
details provided in Appendix B)
1(x) = 1(x) = C1 cos (x) if x  [0, b1]
2(x) = 2(x) = C2 cos[(x 2)] if x  [b1, b2] (12)
4It can be shown that no asymmetric configuration with three districts can be a spatial equilibrium
(see Appendix C).
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where
C1 =

2

P 21 + P
2
2 + 2P1P2 and C2 =

2
(P2 + P1) (13)
while 2 = b2  /(2) and the district borders b1 and b2 solve
sin b1 =
P1
P 21 + P
2
2 + 2P1P2
(14)
cos  (b2  b1) = P1
P1 + P2
(15)
The corresponding urban structure is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
In the above urban structure, the no-relocation arbitrage conditions (b) are always
satisfied. This means that no individual has an incentive to relocate in the district hosting
the other population. On the one hand, because of its size, the large population benefits
from more numerous social interactions. It is better o locating around the city center
where it gets a closer access to agents of its own group. For x  [b1, b2], condition (6)
leads to the utility gradient U 1(x) =  (1 )
P1  (P+2 (x) P2 (x)) < 0 as P2 < P1.
Hence U1(x)  U1(0) for x  [b1, b2]. On the other hand, the small population has
no incentive to relocate to the center. To show this, observe that by condition (6),
for x  [0, b1], we get P+2 (x) = P2 (x) = P2/2 so that the utility gradient U 2(x) =
 (1 ) (P+1 (x) P1 (x)) increases from zero to  (1 )P1 > 0 when x rises from
0 to b1. This means that U 2(x)  0 and thus U2(x)  U2(b1), x  [0, b1]. Intuitively, the
higher density of the large population in the city center also benefits the small population.
Although it interacts less frequently with the large group, it gets a close access to a large
number of agents of the other group.
These arguments yield the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 The urban structure with three segregated districts and the large popula-
tion in the central district is always a spatial equilibrium.
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In this three-district city, the large population occupies the city area where it benefits
from a closer access to both populations at a high residence cost while the small population
benefits from lower land rents in the city edges at the expense of a higher access cost.
Moreover, the city exhibits a single subcenter in x = 0. This is because the location
x = 2 cannot be a subcenter for population 2. If it were so, one should have 2 > b1,
which contradicts the condition 2 = b2  /(2) and  (b2  b1) < /2 imposed by (15).
Hence, in this urban structure, the large population constitutes a basin of attraction that
is large enough to impede the creation of subcenters within the small population’ districts.
Large population in the edge district We now consider a spatial configuration where
the small population 2 resides within the central district [b2, b2] and the large population
1 within the two edge districts [b1,b2] and [b2, b1]. This structure is reminescent of some
US cities like Detroit where the White population resides away from the city center while
the Black (ethnic) population resides within the center.
The equilibrium analysis performed in the previous subsection applies here by simply
swapping subscripts 1 and 2. The corresponding urban structure is depicted in the right
panel of Figure 2. Yet, an important change concerns the no-relocation arbitrage condition
(b) as the small population may here have an incentive to relocate in a peripheral district.
We have that, for x  [b2, b1], U 2(x) =  (1 )
P2  (P+1 (x) P1 (x)) which rises
from  (1 )P2 < 0 to  (1 ) (P1  P2) > 0. Hence, U2(x) is a convex function on
the interval [b2, b1]. Therefore, because U2(x) is constant for all x  [b2, b1], the condition
U2(0)  U2(x) is equivalent to U2(0)  U2(b1). The utility dierential U2(0) U2(b1)  0
can be written as (see details provided in Appendix B)
(1 + ) 2

(2 + P1/P2)P1/P2  2(1 + ) arcsin


 + P1/P2

(16)
As in the analysis of two-district cities, only individuals of the small population may
benefit from relocating to the large population area.
Proposition 6 The urban structure with three segregated districts and the small popula-
tion in the central district is a spatial equilibrium if U2(0)  U2(b1); that is, if condition
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(16) holds.
A numerical analysis of condition (16) shows that the above three-district city is a
spatial equilibrium if population sizes are suciently similar or if inter-group interactions
are weak enough. The explanation for this is as follows. Consider the case where the small
population in the city center shrinks and the large population in the city edges grows. The
growth of the large population increases the benefits of intra- and inter-group interactions
while the decline of the small population diminishes these benefits. At city edges, the
stronger intra-group interactions entice the large population to increase their bid for land
use. This pressure on land rents in city edges transmits to the city center. At the same
time, individuals of the small population benefits more from inter-group interactions than
from intra-group ones, and have less incentive to stay close to each other. At some point,
when the small population is small enough, its agents find the city edges more attractive
and start relocating there. The three-district urban structure with the small population
at the central district can then no longer be a spatial equilibrium. Note that the existence
of such an equilibrium configuration stems from a coordination problem. Although the
large population would benefit from locating around the city center, no individual agent
has an incentive to do so as she would face an excessive land rent and lose access to her
own group which is located in the city edges.
By swapping subscripts 1 and 2 in expressions (13)-(14), we get the coecients Ci and
the district borders bi
C1 =

2
(P1 + P2) and C2 =

2

P 21 + P
2
2 + 2P1P2
where 1 = b1  /(2) and b1 and b2 solve
sin b2 =
P2
P 21 + P
2
2 + 2P1P2
cos  (b1  b2) = P2
P2 + P1
The city exhibits a single subcenter at x = 0 as b21 > 0. Indeed, the last condition
implies that b1  b2 < /(2), which yields 1  b2 < 0 because 1 = b1  /(2). This
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result is similar to that found in the previous case, where the large population locates in
the central district.
Corollary 7 Regardless of which population locates in the central district, the three-
district city exhibits a single subcenter.
In a three-district city, any population located around the city center creates a strong
basin of attraction for both populations and impedes the creation of subcenters in the
periphery, see Figure 2.
5 Discussion
In this section, we study the properties of the equilibrium structures obtained in Section 4,
discuss the multiplicity of equilibria, and compare the utilities derived by each population
group.
5.1 Comparative statics
Table 1 summarizes the comparative statics analysis of the two- and three-district con-
figurations denoted respectively by (21), (212) and (121) indicating which population
occupies the central district (see Appendices A and B for mathematical expressions). So
as to ease the comparison, we denote the district area by Bi = bi for the two-district
city and the central district of a three-district city, and by Bi = 2 (bi  bj) for an edge
district hosting population i = j in a three-district city. Many results are identical to all
city structures. For instance, more frequent inter-group interactions (higher ), weaker
preferences for space or larger access costs (higher 2 = 2/) induce spatial concentra-
tion: agents locate closer to other individuals of their own group and reside in districts
with smaller areas Bi and larger densities Ci; see columns 1, 2, 5 and 6. This is intu-
itive: agents substitute the use of space for social interactions so as to benefit from more
frequent interactions with individuals of their own groups.
23
City structure dBi
d
dBi
d
dB1
d(P1/P2)
dB2
d(P1/P2)
dCi
d
dCi
d
dCi
d(P1/P2)
subcenter(s)
12 - - + - + + + 1 or 2
212 - - - - + + + 1
121 - - + - + + + 1
Table 1: Comparative statics summary
Other results may dier across city structures. On the one hand, the emergence of
a second subcenter may arise in a two-district city only, see column 8. This point has
been commented in Section 4 already. On the other hand, the impact of a rise in the
population ratio P1/P2 on the area of districts depends on the city structure. For any
urban structure, a rise in the ratio P1/P2 induces the small population 2 to live in a district
with a smaller area B2 simply because fewer agents demand land space (see column 4).
This also increases the density amplitude Ci for both populations (see column 7). This
is because the increased number of individuals of population 1 raises their incentive to
locate closer to each others. The pressure on land rents exerted by population 1 increases,
which transmits to the district hosting population 2 that is then enticed to use less space.
By contrast, the eect of rise in the ratio P1/P2 on the district hosting the large
population 1 depends on whether the large population locates in the city edge. When
this is the case (i.e. configurations 21 and 121), population 1 can expand horizontally
through an increase of the district area (that is a larger B1 as reflected in see rows 1
and 3 in column 3). This horizontal expansion is due to the availability of cheap land
at city edges. On the other hand, when the large population 1 occupies the central
district (i.e. configuration 212), land rents at the edge of the central district are so high
that any horizontal expansion is refrained. Instead, population 1 concentrates around
the district center. Moreover, the rising share of population 1 increases the benefit from
intra-group social interactions, which induces population 1 to concentrate even further.
As a consequence, the area of the central district B1 shrinks (see row 2 in column 3).
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5.2 Multiplicity of equilibria
Here we analyze the conditions under which the urban structures analyzed in Section 4
exist. In particular, we highlight the possibility of multiple spatial equilibria. Figure 3
depicts the equilibrium urban structures with two or three segregated districts in terms of
the population ratio P1/P2 and the intensity of inter-group interactions . A population
residing in a district exhibiting a subcenter (resp. no subcenter) is indicated by a bold
number (resp. regular number). Note that the curves displayed in Figure 3 are indepen-
dent of , and therefore of the preference for land  and the access cost  . This means that
Figure 3 accounts for all the parameters of the model ( and P1/P2). The two-district city
is an equilibrium provided that P1/P2 and  are not too large (see areas 12 and 12). The
three-district city with the large population 1 living in the central district is always an
equilibrium regardless of parameter values (see area 212). In contrast, the three-district
city with the small population 2 living in the central district is an equilibrium only for
a low population ratio P1/P2 and a low  (see area 121). Figure 3 illustrates the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria. Depending on parameter values (P1/P2 and ), the economy
exhibits one, two, or three spatial equilibria. The more similar the population sizes P1
and P2, and the weaker the inter-group interactions , the more likely several equilibria
to emerge.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
When several spatial configurations are possible, spatial equilibria can be ranked in
terms of the utility derived by each population. Though this ranking could not be es-
tablished analytically, it does not depend on the preference for land  nor on the access
cost  . Figure 4 displays each population’s preferred urban configuration in terms of the
population ratio (P1/P2) and the intensity  of inter-group interactions.5
5Figure 4 summarizes the information contained in Tables 2 and 3 provided in Appendix D.
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INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
For high population ratios and strong inter-group interactions, the urban structure
(212) is the unique spatial equilibrium and leaves no other choice to individuals. However,
multiple equilibria exist for low population ratios or weak inter-group interactions. Figure
4 shows that population 1 prefers the three-district structure (P1:212) where it resides
in the central district while population 2 prefers the two-district configuration (P2:21).
In this case, both populations therefore disagree about the urban structure to adopt.
Finally, for suciently low population ratios, both populations prefer the two-district
urban configuration (P1:21 and P2:21). In this latter case, urban configurations are Pareto
ranked and a common agreement can be reached so as to which spatial equilibrium is best.
A somewhat surprising result of our analysis is that the small population 2 always
gets a higher utility in the two-district configuration. This configuration is preferred over
the three-district urban configuration even if population 2 resides in the central district.
This is because in the three-district urban configuration (121), the pressure on land prices
exerted by population 1 in city edges transmits to the central district and outweights the
benefits of intra-group interactions of population 2. Figure 4 also shows that population
1 displays a similar preference for the two-district configuration when populations have
similar sizes. In this case, population 1 is worse o in configuration (212) as it faces
too high land prices in the central district which outweights the benefit of intra-group
interactions. It is the lack of access to city edges where land is cheaper that makes
population 1 prefer configuration (21).
5.3 City growth and social integration
Our model helps understanding how city growth may aect urban structures. When city
growth is not anticipated by agents, the urban structure depends only on population
sizes. However, if both populations grow at the same rate, the urban structure remains
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unchanged. If some population grows at a faster rate than the other one, the city may
incur a spontaneous restructuring process. To illustrate such a transition, suppose that
the small population remains constant and has initially a size similar to that of the large
group. In this case, it is possible that it resides in the central district surrounded by two
edge districts hosting the large population (configuration 121). As the large population
grows in size, it exerts a high pressure on land rents, which transmits from the city edges
into the city center through the land market. At some point, the small population moves
to a city edge, replacing the former population which was living there. This corresponds
to a transition from configuration 121 to configuration 21, see transition a in Figure 3.
The intuition is as follows. Rents have become too high in the central district so that some
individuals of the small population have an incentive to move to the city edge so as to
benefit from lower rents even though their intra-group interactions become more costly. As
more of these individuals move to the edge district, their intra-group interactions become
less costly, which makes the city edge more attractive. The restructuring process ends
when all individuals of the small population 2 have relocated to the city edge. Of course,
in our model this transition is instantaneous. Moreover, consequences of city growth do
not end up here.
As the large population grows further in size, the city district hosting it expands hori-
zontally, repelling the small population further away. At some point, the small population
relocates in the two city edges (configuration 212). This corresponds to a transition from
configuration 21 to configuration 212, see transition b in Figure 3. When the population
ratio P1/P2 increases, configuration 21 has to restructure as it ceases to be an equilibrium.
Intuitively, as the large population derives larger benefits from its intra-group social in-
teractions, it can bid more for land. This pressure on land rents transmits in the small
population’s district through the land market so that this latter population spread across
locations to face lowee land rents. By relocating to both city edges, the small population
ends up splitting into two sub-groups. By doing so, it compensates the loss in inter-group
interactions by larger land plots.
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Because of multiple equilibria, city growth may induce spontaneous transition from one
urban structure to another. So, urban structures depend on history. Whereas the growth
of the large population can reshape the urban structure, a decline of this population has
no eect on it. This is because any urban structure, which is an equilibrium for some
initial population levels, remains so as the large population falls in size, see Figure 3.
Interestingly, this suggests that over time, old cities like Paris have undergone several
transitions and are now locked in configuration 212 with the large (native) population in
the city center. In contrast, younger US cities like New York or Detroit may not have
undergone such transitions and display an urban configuration with the minority group
in the city center (configuration 121). Our model implies that over the long run, the
minority group will be repelled to the city edge if the native population grows a faster
rate than the minority group.
Our model also sheds some light on the impact of social integration programs on
urban structures. Schooling and social programs aim at fostering social integration of
immigrants with the native population. Urban planners and labor and urban economists
often advocate a better social integration for eciency and equity reasons. For instance,
in Benabou (1993), under-investment in education is due to market imperfections arising
from local human capital spillovers. Also, de Marti and Zenou (2012) point out that
only substantial (versus partial) lower inter-community socialization costs can improve
eciency. Interpreting the frequency  of inter-group interactions as an indicator of social
integration, our model provides some interesting insights, see Figure 3. First, segregation
prevails as long as  < 1. Therefore, the level of social integration should be very high
(actually  = 1) to eliminate spatial segregation and yield spatial integration. So, the
lack of spatial integration should not be considered as an indicator of ineciency of social
integration programs. Second, when both populations have similar sizes, social integration
programs that promote higher frequencies of inter-group interactions have no eect on the
city structure. The population residing in the city center and in the city edges does not
relocate as the frequency  of inter-group interactions decreases. This means that social
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integration programs may be ineective in reshaping the urban landscape. Third, when
one population is significantly larger than the other one, social integration may even
fragment spatially the minority group and split into subgroups (see transition c in Figure
3).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how segregated districts emerge endogenously in a city
and how multiple spatial equilibria arise. Our analysis embeds Shelling’s (1971) spatial
segregation framework and Beckmann’s (1976) urban land market. We have discussed
the implications of our model regarding city growth and social integration programs. The
paper also sets the stage for future research. Dynamic considerations, which are absent
from our model, may be useful in understanding the evolution of spatial neighborhoods
and how history may select spatial equilibria. The spatial segregation of several groups
into several urban districts is another issue to be examined. It would also be interesting
to compare the equilibrium outcome with the socially optimal allocation of resources, as
well as with the outcome of spatial/social integration programs that involve some specific
social mix within urban districts. Finally, the present analysis might be usefully exploited
to discuss issues related to urban labor markets, school segregation and social capital.
Indeed, part of the benefits of social interactions is the access to information about jobs
(see Granovetter, 1973; Zenou, 2012). School pupils’ composition may shape the long run
frequencies of inter-group social interactions and therefore aect urban segregation. Also,
social interactions and the spatial distribution of agents contribute to the social capital
that agents have in urban areas.
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Appendix A: two-district urban structure
By expression (7), we can set 1 = C1 cos[(x  1)] and 2 = C2 cos[(x + 2)]. First,
1(b1) = 2(b2) = 0 implies that
1(b1) = C1 cos[(b1  1)] = C2 cos[(b2 + 2)] = 2(b2) = 0
so that
b1 = 1 +

2
; b2 = 2 +

2
Second, U 1(b1) = U

2(b2) = 0 implies that
P2  P1 + C2 sin[(b2 + 2)] = 0
P1  P2 + C1 sin[(b1  1)] = 0
so that
C1 =
(P1 + P2)
2
; C2 =
(P1 + P2)
2
Therefore,
C1
C2
=
P1 + P2
P1 + P2
Third population constraints
 b1
0
1(x)dx = P1 and
 0
b2 2(x)dx = P2 imply
C1

(1 + sin(1)) = P1
C2

(sin(2) + 1) = P2
which yields
1 : sin(1) =
P1  P2
P1 + P2
=  cos(b1)
2 : sin(2) =
P2  P1
P2 + P1
=  cos(b2)
Surplus dierential: We now compute the equilibrium condition S2(b2)  S2(b1).
For any x  [0, b1], we can write
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S2(x) =

(1  |x y|)2(y)dy + 

(1  |x y|)1(y)dy
=
 0
b2
(1  |x y|)2(y)dy + 
 b1
0
(1  |x y|)1(y)dy
Applying this expression to the locations x = b2 and x = b1 we get
S2(b2) S2(b1) = 
 0
b2
(2y  b1 + b2)2(y)dy  
 b1
0
(2y  b1 + b2)1(y)dy
One computes 0
b2
(2y  b1 + b2)2(y)dy = (b1 + b2)P2 +
 0
b2
(2y)2(y)dy
= (b1 + b2)P2 + C2
 0
b2
(2y) cos[(y + 2)]dy
= (b1 + b2)P2 + C2 2
2
(cos 2  b2)
where the last line obtains because 0
b2
(2y) cos ( (y + 2)) dy =
2
2
 0
b2
y cos (y + 2) dy
=
2
2
 0
b2
z cos (z + 2) dz
=
2
2
(cos 2  cos  (2  b2) + b2 sin  (2  b2))
=
2
2
(cos 2  b2)
Also, one computes b1
0
(2y  b1 + b2)1(y)dy = (b1 + b2)P1 +
 b1
0
(2y)1(y)dy
= (b1 + b2)P1 + 2C1
 b1
0
y cos[(y  1)]dy
= (b1 + b2)P1 + 2C1 1
2
( cos 1 + b1)
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where the last line obtains because b1
0
y cos[(y  1)]dy = 1
2
 b1
0
y cos (y  1) dy
=
1
2
 b1
0
z cos (z  1) dz
=
1
2
( cos 1 + b1)
Therefore, the surplus dierential is positive i S2(b2) S2(b1)  0; that is, if
C2 (cos 2  b2) + C1 ( cos 1 + b1)  
2
2
(b1  b2) (P2 + P1)
or equivalently
b1P2(1 + 2) + (P1 + P2) cos 1  (P2 + P1) cos 2 > 0 (17)
Because
cos2 1 = 1 sin2 1 = 1

P1  P2
P1 + P2
2
= 4
P1P2
(P1 + P2)
2
cos2 2 = 1 sin2 2 = 1

P2  P1
P2 + P1
2
= 4
P1P2
(P2 + P1)
2
we have that
(P1 + P2) cos 2   (P1 + P2) cos 1 = 2 (1 )

P1P2
So, the condition (17) becomes
2

P1/P2 < (1 + )

  arccos

P1/P2  
P1/P2 + 

Comparative statics Here is a comparative statics analysis of the city equilibrium.
First, population densities increase and district borders shrink as the access cost increases
and the preference for space falls (a higher 2 = 2/ raises Ci and reduces bi), see
relations (9) and (10). The population density increases as population sizes grow in equal
proportions (keeping P1/P2 constant, higher values of P1 and P2 raise Ci only). A larger
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share of population 1 (P1/P2) leads district 1 to expand and district 2 to shrink. The
city expands (larger bi) if the frequency of inter-group interaction () falls, see relation
(10). So, more frequent inter-group interactions concentrate populations further as they
are able to bid more for land.
Utilities Utilities can be computed as
U1 = P1

1 2+ 
2
b2 (P2 + P1) 
2
b1 (P1 + P2) +


( 1)

P1P2 + Y
U2 =

2
b2(P1 + P2) 
2
b1(P1 + P2) 

(1 )

P1P2 + Y
Their dierence is given by
U = P1

1 2 1
2
(1 ) [b1(P1 + P2) b2(P1 + P2)]
Appendix B: three-district urban structure
Here, we focus on the case when the large population 1 is in the city center. The converse
configuration can be obtained by swapping subscripts 1 and 2. By using the expressions
1 = C1 cos (x) if x  [0, b1] and 2 = C2 cos[(x 2)] if x  [b1, b2], the conditions for
population mass conservation and land rent arbitrage at district borders become
P1 =
 b1
b1 cos (x) dx = 2C1
1 sin b1
P2 = 2C2
1 [sin (b2  2) sin (b1  2)]
2(b

1 ) =
1
2
C22 cos
2[(b1  2)] = 12C21 cos2 (b1) = 1(b+1 )
2(b2) = C2 cos[(b2  2)] = 0
(18)
The last line of (18) implies that b2  2 = /2. In addition, note that U 2(b2) = 0
implies that by (5), 2(b2) =   [P2 + P1], which yields
C2 =
1
2
 (P2 + P1)
because 2(b2) = C2 sin (b1  2) = C2.
35
The three first lines of (18) become
P1
2C1
= sin b1
1 P2
2C2
= sin (b1  2)
cos[(b12)]
cos(b1)
= C1
C2
Squaring those expressions and using cos2 x = 1 sin2 x yields
C21 = (/2)
2 P 21 + P 22 + 2P1P2
So,
sin (b1  2) = 1 P2
(P2 + P1)
=
P1
P1 + P2
sin2 b1 =
P 21
P 21 + P
2
2 + 2P1P2
Utility dierential: We now compute the equilibrium condition U2(0)  U2(b1). For
any x  [0, b1], we can write
U2(0) = 
 b2
b1
(1 + y)1(y)dy + 2
 b2
0
(1 y)2(y)dy
+ 
 b1
b2
(1 y)1(y)dy  2(0)
U2(b1) = 
 b2
b1
(1 (b1  y))1(y)dy +
 b2
b2
(1 (b1  y))2(y)dy
+ 
 b1
b2
(1 (b1  y))1(y)dy  1(b1)
By replacing the value of (b1, b2,1,2, C1, C2), we get that the condition U2(0)U2(b1)  0
is equivalent to
(1 + ) 2

P (P + 2)  2(1 + ) arcsin( 
P + 
)
where P = P1/P2.
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Comparative statics when the large population is at the city center First,
population densities increase and district borders shrink as the access cost increases and
the preference for space falls (a higher 2 = 2/ raises both C1 and C2 by relation (13),
while it reduces b2  b1 and b1 by relations (15) and (14)). Second, population densities
increase as population sizes grow in equal proportions: keeping P1/P2 constant, larger
populations P1 and P2 raise C1 and C2 only. Third, the city expands (larger b1 and
b2  b1) if the frequency of inter-group interactions  decreases. The lower returns from
inter-group interactions induce lower bid rents, and thus the dispersion of agents. Fourth,
a larger share of population 1 (P1/P2) leads the central district to shrink and the edge
district to expand (a higher ratio P1/P2 raises b1  b2 and decreases b1 by relations (15)
and (14)).
Comparative statics when the large population is at the city edge The com-
parative statics analysis is derived in a way similar to that used in the previous case. We
simply need to swap subscripts 1 and 2. Hence, population densities increase and the
district borders shrink as the access cost increases and the preference for space falls (a
higher 2 = 2/ raises C1 and C2 while it reduces b1  b2 and b2). Population densities
increase as population sizes grow in equal proportions (keeping P1/P2 constant, higher
values of P1 and P2 raise C1 and C2 only). The city expands (larger b2 and b1 b2) when
the frequency of inter-group interaction () decreases. A larger share of population 1
(P1/P2) decreases the area of the central district hosting population 2 (smaller b2) and
increases that of the edge district hosting population 1 (larger b1  b2).
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Appendix C
We here show that no asymmetric configuration with three districts can be a spatial
equilibrium. We consider the following equilibrium candidate
1(x) = C1 cos(x), y  [b2, b1]
2(x) =
 C2 cos((x 1)) , x  [b1, b3]C3 cos((x+ 2)) , x  [b4,b2]
and we show that equilibrium conditions are not compatible with the above asymmetric
solution.
The conditions U 2(b3) = U´2(b4) = 0 lead to P2  P1 + C2 sin((b3  1)) =
P2 + P1 + C3 sin((b4 + 2)) = 0. By using conditions 1(b1) = 2(b1), 1(b1) =
2(b1), and 2(b2) = 1(b2),we get (b3  1) = (b4 + 2) = /2 and
C21 = C
2
2 cos
2((b1  1))/ cos2(b1) = C23 cos2((b2 + 2))/ cos2(b2)
The conditions U 2(b3) = U´2(b4) = U´1(0) = 0 lead respectively to C2 = C3 =
(P2 + P1)/() and
sin(b2) sin(b1) (sin((b2 + 2)) + sin((b1  1))) = 0
The two above conditions can be written as
m2 m1  (m4 +m3) = 0
(1m23)(1m22) (1m24)(1m21) = 0
where m1, m2, m3, and m4 denote sin(b1), sin(b2), sin((b11)), and sin((b2+2)).
The solutions for m2 and m4 are
(m1,m3) and
(
m1 +m31  2m3 + 2m21m3  2m1 + 2m1m23
1 +m21 + 2  2m23
,
m3 +m21m3  2m1 + 2m1m23  2m3 + 2m23
1 +m21 + 2  2m23
)
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The first solution corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium while the second one is
our asymmetric candidate.
By plugging the second solution into the two constraints, C1/(m1 + m2) = P1 and
C2/(m4  m3 + 2) = P2, we get a system of equations for m1 and m3. The solutions
are given by (m1,m3) = (P1(  1)/(P2 + P1), P1(  1)/(P2 + P1)) and (m1,m3) =
(P1(+1)/(P2+P1), P1(1+)(P2+P1)). Both solutions imply thatm1 < 0 meaning
that b1 would be negative.
Appendix D
Table 2 (resp. Table 3) provides the ranking of urban configurations (21, 212, and 121)
for individuals of population 1 (resp. for individuals of population 2).
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE
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P1/P2 > ?-1
2? 1?
)(2 x?
)(1 x?
)(xi?
2? 1?
)(2 x?
)(1 x?
)(xi?
x x
Figure 1: Two-district cities
2b? 1b0 2b? 1b0
The shaded area corresponds to the large population 1. In the left panel (resp. right panel), the urban
structure displays a single subcenter (resp. two subcenters).
P1/P2 < ?-1
2?
)(2 x?
)(1 x?
)(xi?
x
Figure 2: Three-district cities
)(2 x?
2??2b? 2b0 1b1b?
1?
)(2 x?
)(1 x?
)(xi?
x
)(1 x?
1??
1b? 1b0 2b2b?
The shaded area corresponds to the large population 1. In the left panel (resp. right panel), the large population 1 is
hosted in the central district (resp. in the edge districts).
?21 PP
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(2 1 2) (2 1)
(2 1 2) (2 1)  (1 2 1)
Figure 3: Urban structure equilibria
Two- and three-district equilibria in terms of the population ratio P1/P2 and the intensity of inter-group interactions ?. The two-
district city (21) (resp. the three-district city (121)) is a spatial equilibrium for parameter values at the left of the solid curve, 
representing condition (13) (resp. the dashed curve, representing condition (20)). Note that the three-district city (212) is a spatial 
equilibrium for all parameter values. The condition determining the number of subcentres in Corollary 4 is represented by the 
dotted curve so that a population residing in a district exhibiting a subcentre (resp. no subcentre) is indicated by a bold number 
(resp. a regular number).
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Figure 4: Preferred urban configuration by each population. 
Above the dashed curve, the only equilibrium is (212). Below the solid curve, both populations prefer the 
two-district city (21). In between these two curves, population 1 prefers the three-district city (212) while
population 2 prefers the two-district structure (21).
?
21 PP
P1:(21)
P2:(21)
P1:(212)
P2:(21)
(212)
Table 2: Urban configuration ranking for population 1
Each cell presents the ranking of urban configurations from most preferred
to least preferred by population 1.
P1?P2?1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
??0.9
21
212
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21 212 212 212 212 212
0.8
21
212
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21 212 212 212 212
0.7
21
212
121
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21 212 212 212 212
0.6
21
212
121
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21 212 212
0.5
21
212
121
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21 212
0.4
21
212
121
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
0.3
21
212
121
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
0.2
21
212
121
21
212
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
0.1
21
212
121
21
212
21
212
21
212
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
Table 3: Urban configuration ranking for population 2
Each cell presents the ranking of urban configurations from most preferred
to least preferred by population 2.
P1?P2?1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
??0.9
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212 212 212 212 212 212
0.8
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212 212 212 212 212
0.7
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212 212 212 212 212
0.6
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212 212 212
0.5
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212 212
0.4
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
0.3
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
0.2
21
121
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
21
212
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